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ABSTRACT

The increasing number of cyber attacks on industries demands immediate attention for providing more secure mechanisms to safeguard industries and minimize
risks. A supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system employing the
distributed networks of sensors and actuators that interact with the physical environment is vulnerable to attacks that target the interface between the cyber and
physical subsystems. These cyber attacks are typically malicious actions that cause
undesired results in the cyber physical world, for example, the Stuxnet attack that
targeted Iran’s nuclear centrifuges. An attack that hijacks the sensors in an attempt
to provide false readings to the controller can be used to feign normal system operation for the control system, while the attacker can hijack the actuators to send the
system beyond its safety range. Cyber physical systems (CPS) being used in industries such as oil and gas, chemical process plants and the like are termed Industrial
Control Systems (ICS). Control system security is aimed at preventing intentional or
unintentional interference with the proper operation of ICS. This thesis proposes a
process-aware approach with the use of invariant equations based on the physical and
chemical properties of the process and a Multiple Security Domain Nondeducibility
(MSDND) framework to detect when a sensor signal is being maliciously manipulated.
We have taken a benzene production plant as case study to illustrate our approach
and its effectiveness in determining the state of the system. A system without any
MSDND secure information flows between the CPS and cyber monitors has fewer
weaknesses that can be exploited.
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NOMENCLATURE

SYMBOL DESCRIPTION
sx

A boolean state variable, x is true or false

W

The set of all possible worlds of the system

w

A world of interest

φ

A boolean statement that can be evaluated

⊕

Exclusive OR (xor)

SDi

Represents the security domain with respect to i

Vxi (φ)

A valuation function of boolean x in domain i

Bi φ

Modal BELIEF operator

Ti,j φ

Modal TRUST operator

Ii,j φ

Modal INFORMATION TRANSFER operator

p

Pressure reading

f

Flow rate reading

t

Temperature reading

l

Level indicator reading

β

β represents the parameter in consideration β ∈ {p,t,f ,l}

F

Feed to the distillation column

B

Bottom output of the distillation column

D

Distillate of the distillation column

1. INTRODUCTION

Our increasing dependence on technology and web-based communication has
opened the door for cyber security threats, and the chemical and manufacturing
sectors are prime targets. Successful attacks on chemical and other manufacturing
facilities and systems can disrupt services and operations and endanger entire populations. With the growing number and sophistication of cyber attacks, securing access
to sensitive information and hazardous substances has never been more important or
necessary. A chemical plant is typically an industrial process plant that manufactures
or processes chemicals on a large scale. Such a plant has an input of a given set of raw
materials and performs operations (reactions) on them to produce a desired chemical
output along with some residual outputs. These plants use specialized equipment,
units and technology in the manufacturing process. Ample amount of attention is
focused on safety and operational reliability along with information confidentiality,
integrity and availability. Due to a vast and widely spread infrastructure, there is a
possibility of security breach either by an intruder or an insider. Physical security is
an equally important as cyber security for these infrastructures. Imagine an intruder
hacking into the system and changing critical parameters like temperature or pressure
in the operational units or even changing the raw material ratios etc. The damage
could be catastrophic. The major consequences of a security breach are the following:
• Plant Sabotage/Shutdown
• Intellectual Property Theft
• Physical Hazard/Material Spill
• Overpressure/Expansion/Explosion
• Exposures/Health Issues from Releases beyond Plant Limits
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The National Institute of Standards and Technology in its Public Working Group in
CPS (NIST) [4] cites major security concerns of a chemical plant as Process Safety
and Equipment Safety. These can be maintained by high reliability and security and
only cyber-physical security can provide the necessary protection against attacks on
the control processes. While the NIST document discounts privacy as a concern due
to a lack of personally identifiable information, one can envision confidentiality of the
actual processes as desirable. The biggest threat to CPS is from the targeted attacks
where the attackers have a deep knowledge of the targeted controller and various
processes controlled by it. Attackers can take advantage of vulnerabilities in CPS to
take control of the system. With physical manifestations in the real world, attacks on
CPSs can cause disruption to physical services or create a national disaster. A first
generation of research on securing CPSs focused on the IT infrastructure deployed
around industrial processes; it was observed that in many cases appropriate network
security measures were lacking putting the processes at risk. The dominant suggestion was to adapt state-of-the-art network security solutions such as cryptographic
protocols, intrusion detection systems, and firewalls to the industrial application domain. These defenses primarily deal with attacks on the IT infrastructure. This
research assumes an attacker like stuxnet that can manipulate actuators to cause
impact on the process and hides real process measurements from the control room
and/or the process operator. We investigate methods for identifying those readings
that have been manipulated. Specifically, we consider attacks generating believable
artificial values, that is the values may reside in the lower and upper threshold of
the process and presenting that data to the operator to deceive her about the true
state of a process. However, these can have an impact on the system in the long term
compromising the efficiency of the product or the process. As a cyber physical system
requires a tight coupling between the physical and cyber controlling components, it
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is crucial to ensure that the system is secure for all the cyber and physical processes.
Therefore, protecting the CPSs’ against cyber attacks is of paramount importance.
Traditional security methods can be applied to protect a CPS against cyber
threats or threats imposed by malicious insiders. However, due to the unique characteristics and complexity of a CPS, traditional security models and approaches are not
sufficient enough to address the security challenges of a CPS. In order to identify the
loopholes in the system, a complementary approach was proposed more than thirty
years ago to track and regulate the information flows of the system to prevent secret
data from leaking to unauthorized parties. This work was the origin of the theory
used in this paper [5].
Information flow security in CPS can lead to particularly complex security
partitions. Tools that work well with securing the cyber part of the system rarely
work well to keep the physically observable parts of the system from leaking information. Physically locking the fence around the physical parts of the CPS does not
protect from a purely cyber attack. Typical electronic or cryptographic solutions do
not match specific cases closely enough to handle the cyber-physical interfaces. A
persistent attacker with enough time and backing will get in [1].
This thesis examines the current security models in practice for informationflow technology and tries to identify some of the main obstacles of putting them into
practice. It also introduces a new information flow security model to minimize the
shortcomings of the traditional models. The effectiveness of this model is demonstrated by modeling security aspects of chemical plant.

1.1. MOTIVATION
Critical infrastructure systems, such as electricity, gas and water distribution
systems have been subject to changes in the last decades. The need for distributed
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monitoring and control to support their operations has fuelled the practice of integrating information and communication technology to physical systems. Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems have been the first approach to distributed monitoring and control by means of information technology. From a larger
perspective, this integration has led to the term “Cyber-Physical System” (CPS),
where physical processes, computation and information exchange are coupled together to provide improved efficiency, functionality and reliability. The inherently
distributed nature of production and distribution and the incorporation of mass scale
sensors and faster management dynamics, and fine-grained adaptability to local failures and overloads are the means to achieve this.
Security in critical systems has historically been an important matter of concern, even when the cyber domain was not present. Attacks in the physical domain
can have severe impacts on society and can have disastrous consequences. In the past,
most of the security mechanisms were implemented using physical protection. Critical assets were typically located in controlled environments, and this often prevented
the occurrence of undesired manipulations. In some cases, however, physical protection is not always fully applicable. Chemical plants, for example, deserve special
attention in critical infrastructure protection. The process used in a chemical plant is
known, so in thesis more attention has to be focused on integrity attacks rather than
confidentiality. In contrast to some other infrastructures where the physical access
to the critical assets may be possible to restrict, in chemical plants there are a large
number of remote access points difficult to control and protect from accidental or
intentional attack.
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1.2. THESIS OUTLINE
This thesis is organized as follows, Section II describes related work and some
of the key definitions which are used for analysing and modeling the security of a
chemical plant, Section III describes the system model that has been taken into consideration i.e., a benzene production plant. A brief overview of the hydrodeaklylation
process through which benzene is produced has also been described. Section IV describes the problem statement and the attack model. Section V looks at related
efforts. Section VI shows the mathematical analysis of the threats/attacks stated
and mitigations for phase-I of the chemical plant and Section VII shows the analysis
of the attack on phase-II of the plant. Section VIII presents concluding remarks and
results.
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2. RELATED WORK

2.1. NONDEDUCIBILITY
2.1.1. Nondeducibility. Nondeducibility (ND) was introduced by Sutherland [5] in an attempt to model information flow in a partitioned model. The partitions are divided into two sets, these sets are usually labeled as high and low with
information restricted to one side of the partition or the other. Information that
cannot be deduced from the other side of the partition is said to be Nondeducibility
secure. However, the partitions must be absolute and the partition is necessarily
simplistic. Absolute divisions are conceptually clean, but they do not reflect the real
world, i.e. they cannot be extended or combined with other security domains (mostly
fixed). Overlapping security domains present difficulties for ND as do information
flows which cannot be evaluated because the model lacks the required valuation functions. However, the restrictions of Sutherland’s ND model made it difficult to model
critical infrastructures like industrial control systems, transportation systems etc.
The motivation to model security for these critical infrastructures and to have much
more refined control over the information being transferred and to deal with multiple
physical and cyber components at a time led to the development of the Multiple
Security Domain Nondeducibility model.
2.1.2. Valuation Function Vxy (φ). Vxy (φ) represents a valuation function
of Boolean x in domain y. A valuation function is a function which assigns a truth
value to question φ in place based on x with respect to the security domain y.
2.1.3. Security Domain (SDi ) [1]. The event system divides the system
into multiple security domains SDi as viewed by each entity i in the model. These
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security domains may or may not overlap with each other. An entity i is any part of
the system that is capable of independent observation or action.

2.2. MULTIPLE SECURITY DOMAIN NONDEDUCIBILTIY
A modal technique to model complex security domains, Multiple Security Domain Model Nondeducibility(MSDND)[1][6] was introduced. MSDND can model any
system where Sutherland Nondeducibility holds and complex systems where Nondeducibility cannot be determined.
2.2.1. Multiple Security Domain Nondeducibility [1]. There exists some
world with a pair of states where one must be true and the other false; i.e., both states
must be mutually exclusive (exclusive OR), but an entity i has no valuation function
for those states. In security domain SDi , i simply cannot know which state is true
and which is false.

MSDND(ES) = ∃ w ∈ W ` [ ( sx ∨ sy ) ] ∧ ∼( sx ∧ sy ) ∧ [ w |= ( 6 ∃ Vxi ( w) ∧
6 ∃ Vyi ( w) ) ]
it can also be written as,
MSDND(ES) = ∃ w ∈ W ` [ ( sx ⊕ sy ) ] ∧ [ w |= ( 6 ∃ Vxi ( w) ∧ 6 ∃ Vyi ( w) ) ]

MSDND is not a high/low hierarchy model, but is instead a partitioning model.
MSDND does not depend upon examining two domains on any relationship between
those domains such as low and high or left and right. The domains in question might
be wholly contained in the other, they might overlap, or they might be disjoint.
Sutherland’s Nondeducibility can be reduced in polynomial time to MSDND[1].
Computer security tools work best when secure domains are cleanly nested
inside less secure domains like a Medieval castle with its outer walls and interior
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keep. This model serves us well for most uses, but breaks down when applied to
CPS. Because CPS typically need to secure both data and information flow, the
security domain picture gets complicated. We need tools that can model the cyber
and physical components of CPS.
MSDND is also being used in modelling security for air traffic control systems, vehicle platoon systems and few other critical infrastructures. MSDND security
model when coupled with invariants shows a promising way improving the resiliency
of CPS.

2.3. BELIEF, INFORMATION TRANSFER AND TRUST (BIT) LOGIC
BIT logic was introduced by Liau [7] [8] to formally reason about belief, information transfer and trust when dealing with cyber entities. While it was developed
primarily for handling trust in database and distributed systems, BIT logic is useful
for describing CPS, especially when humans are involved. Before BIT logic, social engineering attacks could only be described by a narrative in imprecise language. With
BIT logic, spoofing and other unwanted behavior is described with simple, formal
proofs. BIT logic is designed to reason about the belief and trust an entity i has in
information from an entity j, e.g. the belief and trust an operator has in the reading
from a monitoring station.
• Ti,j φ defines the trust i has in a report from j that φ is true
• Bi φ defines the belief by i that φ is true; it does not matter if φ is true or not,
i believes it to be true
• Ii,j φ defines the transfer of information directly from one agent to another,
that is j reported to i that φ is true
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2.4. INVARIANTS
Invariant is a function, quantity, or property that remains unchanged when
a specified transformation is applied. An invariant is a logical predicate on a system
state that should not change its truth value if satisfied by the system execution. An
axiomatic basis for the truth of invariants on cyber systems was first proposed by [9].
Most recently invariants are also known to be used in physical power systems [10] and
water treatment systems [11]. Invariants are well-understood for cyber processes, but
extending them into the physical domains requires some insight. We can arrive at
invariant equations based on the physical or chemical properties of the system which
can be used as an alternative source of information for the parameter under question.
More on invariants is discussed in the further sections.

2.5. EXECUTION MONITORS
Some research has been done in implementing execution monitors like the
Shadow Security Unit (SSU)[12] in industrial control systems. The SSU is attached in
parallel to Remote terminal units (RTUs) or Programmable logic controllers (PLCs),
being able to capture and decode information flow attributed to the Supervisory
control and data acquisition (SCADA) protocol, correlating this information with
the status of the physical I/O modules that interface with sensors and actuators on
the field. This enables the possibility of implementing a redundant security-checking
mechanism that follows a “black box” approach regarding the analysis of the monitored device behavior. Coupling MSDND and a few techniques from SSU along with
the ground truths i.e. the invariant equations we can further reduce the bounds on
parameters measured in a chemical plant and also more accurately determine the
corrupt information path. A ground truth refers to information provided by direct
observation as opposed to information provided by inference. The invariant equations
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are the rules or laws that govern the operation of the plant and are always true.
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3. SYSTEM MODEL

A distinction has been made between embedded systems that use electronic
and physical components developed separately by experts in their respective domains,
and true cyber-physical systems where expertise in both domains must be combined to
advance the state of the art. The chemical industry spends a huge amount of resources
to ensure the safety of its personnel, customers, and surrounding community. The
increase in cyber attacks on chemical plants demands to device new cyber-physical
security measures and frameworks. For example, during summer 2011, a cyber attack
named ‘Nitro’ caused several casualties among targeted companies. Some of them
are part of the defense sector and majority of them belong to the chemical industry.
These companies are spread around the world, from the United States to the United
Kingdom and through Asia. The malware which was used, labeled with the name
‘PoisonIvy’, had the clear intention to steal information. Another attack was the
stuxnet attack that targeted Iran’s nuclear centrifuges. In this section a detailed
mathematical security analysis of a benzene production plant is shown.

3.1. BENZENE PRODUCTION PLANT
A benzene production plant produces benzene through hydrodealkylation (HDA)
of toluene [2]. The below reaction is exothermic and irreversible and takes place in
presence of a catalyst. Figure 3.1 shows the basic process flow diagram of a benzene
plant.

Toluene + Hydrogen → Benzene + Methane + energy

C7 H8 + H2 → C6 H6 + CH4 + energy
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Figure 3.1: Process Flow Diagram

3.2. HYDRODEALKYLATION
HDA Process [2]: The HDA process begins with mixing fresh toluene with
a stream of recycled unreacted toluene, the mixing is achieved in a storage tank.
The toluene is then pumped to combine it with a stream of mixed hydrogen and
fresh hydrogen gas. The mixture of hydrogen and toluene is preheated before it is
introduced to the heater or furnace. In the furnace the stream is heated to 600o C,
the reaction temperature, then introduced into the reactor. The reactor is where the
main reaction happens.
C7 H8 + H2 → C6 H6 + CH4 + energy
The products are then cooled and introduced into a pair of separators that
separate the unreacted hydrogen. A portion of the unreacted hydrogen is compressed
and recycled back to the feed and the reactor. The products leaving the separators
are then heated before being introduced into a distillation column, where toluene is
separated from the stream and recycled to the feed. This allows for greater conversion.
Then further fractionation separates methane and toluene from the benzene product.
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Figure 3.2: P&ID [2]

The mixture of toluene and hydrogen is preheated to get a vaporized mixture
and sent into heater H-101 (Figure 3.2) to heat the mixture to 600o c and this stream
is then fed to the reactor R-101 (Figure 3.2) which is filled with catalysts where the
reaction takes place, the reaction being exothermic, a constant stream of hydrogen
through stream 7 (Figure 3.2) is fed to the reactor to control the temperature. If
the temperature of the reactor is not properly regulated, it might lead to bad quality
of benzene, inefficiency in converting toluene to benzene, can damage the connected
processing units and in the worst case the reactor could blow up.
Examples of critical information in the benzene plant are as follows:
• Temperature readings: In the benzene process, the feed to the reactor is substantially hotter than the rest of the process and is crucial to the operation of
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the process. In addition, the reaction is exothermic, and the reactor effluent
temperature must be carefully monitored.
• Pressure readings: The pressures of the streams to and from the reactor in the
benzene process are also important. The difference in pressure between the
two streams gives the pressure drop across the reactor. This, in turn, gives an
indication of any maldistribution of gas through the catalyst beds.

Figure 3.3: Skeleton of an information path

Different types of information flow paths in the plant are; flow information,
pressure information, temperature information, and level information (Figure 3.3).
Following are a few of the information flow paths at physical infrastructure in the
benzene plant (Figure 3.2). Each information path is enclosed within a box, the
detailed view of the individual components of each information path look like components in the Figure 3.3. Here, the operator need not necessarily be a human, it
can also be another attached control process.
• Toluene Feed Drum (V-101): level and pressure information paths
• High pressure phase separator (V-102): level and pressure information paths
• Low pressure phase separator (V-103): level and pressure information paths
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• Reflux Drum (V-104): level and pressure information paths
• Reactor (R-101): temperature information path
• Distillation column (T-101): temperature, flow and level information paths
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4. PROBLEM STATEMENT

The biggest threat to CPS is from the targeted attacks where the attackers
have a deep knowledge of the targeted controller and various processes controlled by
it. This thesis models stuxnet-like [13] attacks in a chemical plant using MSDND and
BIT logic to locate points of vulnerability. The major focus of these attacks is hiding
critical information rather than stealing it. Once into the system, these viruses stay
dormant and learn the behaviour of the system and then corrupt the information.
There are two basic ways to hide this information: make it impossible to evaluate
the desired question φ , or to disrupt the actual valuation function to return an unreliable valuation of the question φ. It is bad for the system if it is MSDND secure
with respect to integrity since by the definition of MSDND the observer does not
have valuation functions for the states of the system; i.e., the observer cannot determine which state is true and which state is false (he cannot determine if there is any
change in information). However, it is good for the system with respect to confidentiality, because any observer will not be able to know any changes made to the system.

4.1. ATTACK MODEL
Let us assume a stuxnet-like attack on the PLC in the pressure information
path related to stream 8 in Figure 4.1 of a benzene plant. The process of producing
benzene takes place at high temperatures and also the reaction taking place in the
reactor is highly exothermic. This is one of the critical information path because
the hydrogen(H2 ) gas is compressed and pumped back to the reactor to regulate the
temperature of the reactor through this stream. This stream also contains methane
(CH4 ), a highly combustible gas. A particular pressure is used to separate CH4 and
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H2 into two streams. CH4 is sent out as a fuel and H2 to the reactor to regulate
temperature. Imagine the catastrophic damages that can be caused by manipulating
the pressure of H2 in a way that it has least impact in regulating the temperature
of the reactor or pumping CH4 into the reactor causing combustion and possibly
blowing the reactor.

Figure 4.1: Components of interest

We divide the information path into several security domains as shown in the
Figure 4.2. Each of these security domains are independent of each other and are
self contained. Table 4.1 shows the entities contained in each security domain. Each
of the information path for several other parameters like temperature t, pressure p,
flow rate f , level indicator l in the chemical plant are divided into similar security
domains.
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Figure 4.2: Security Domains

Table 4.1: Security Domains
Domain

Unit

SD0

Physical unit(sensor)

SD1

Relay/Computational unit

SD2

PLC

SD3

Stuxnet-like virus

SD4

Control Valve

SD5

Operator

19
5. RELATED EFFORTS

As mentioned earlier, NIST [4] has produced an extensive framework document including cybersecurity requirements for several infrastructures. The US Department of Homeland Security CFATS standards [14] describe processes for security
assessment of chemical plants. A number of international standards have sprung up
illustrating the importance of security and cybersecurity for ICS. This paper provides a mathematical technique for both assessment, and guidance for mitigation of
cyber security attacks. A complementary approach to ours based on learning was
proposed by [15] to determine anomalous behavior within a plant. Both approaches
treat information flow as a key element.
Similar work has been carried out in [1], but that work is limited to accepting
commands from a single source and it does not cover all the possible state transitions
in the system. The major drawback is the inability to represent the state transitions
and interactions in a concise way and our work covers this by segregating the system
into multiple security domains. These security domains contain multiple states and
the security issues between the state interactions are considered.
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6. SECURITY OF CHEMICAL PLANT - PHASE-I

In this section a detailed mathematical analysis of the impact of stuxnet-like
attack on the pressure information path (stream 8 in Figure 4.1) on phase-I of the
chemical plant is shown.

6.1. MSDND ANALYSIS OF PRESSURE p OF THE ATTACK MODEL
Stuxnet-like attacks have the capability to hide critical information or falsify
the critical information and produce information that it desires. This section presents
a detailed analysis of how MSDND can be applied along with the invariant equations
derived from the chemical and physical processes of the plant to make the system
more secure and difficult to break. MSDND analysis from integrity standpoint is
considered here because of the assumption that the process of the plant is already
known to the attacker and thus the process is not confidential (stuxnet-like viruses
learn the system behavior, that means they are already aware of the process to some
extent or whole).
6.1.1. MSDND Under Normal Working Conditions. The following are
some of the critical assumptions taken into consideration while modeling the security
of the chemical plant:
1. under normal working conditions every sensor and actuator report accurate
data.
2. none of the alarms are faulty
3. operators are not corrupt
Theorem 1. The parameter readings p, t, f , l in the chemical plant are not MSDND
secure under normal conditions.
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Proof. Under normal conditions, the data received by the PLC, control unit, operator
is correct and they operate as intended, giving the desired results. Here, the chemical
plant functions normally and the reaction happens as usual. The information path
is divided into security domains as shown in Figure 4.2 and in Table 4.1.
Let β denote a parameter in consideration. (β ∈ {p, t, f , l} Let p be the correct
pressure range for normal working conditions of the system. p ⊕ ∼p is always true
[either pressure is in the desired range or not].
1. β ⊕ ∼ β = true;
2. Sβ ⊕ S∼β = true; system is either normal or not normal
Domain Valuation

Correctness

SD0

Vβ0 (∼ β)

True

SD1

Vβ1 (∼ β)

True

3. SD2

Vβ2 (∼ β)

True

SD3

Vβ3 (∼ β)

True

SD4

Vβ4 (∼ β)

True

SD5

Vβ5 (∼ β)

True

4. The valuations Vβi are correctly evaluated for all the domains, i ∈ {0,1,2,3,4,5}
i
5. MSDND(ES) = ∃ w ∈ W ` [ ( Sβ ⊕ S∼β ) ] ∧ [ w |= ( ∃ V∼β
( w) ∧ ∃ Vβi ( w) ) ]

and i ∈ {0,1,2,3,4,5}
From the above proof we can see that there exist valuations for the a given parameter
reading β in all the security domains, which contradicts the second part of MSDND
definition. Therefore the parameter reading β is not MSDND secure under normal
conditions.
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6.1.2. MSDND Under Attack - Without Alarms. The next theorem
shows what happens in case of an attack where the computational unit (PLC) is
compromised and the pressure control valve can be operated in such a way that
pressure is altered without being observed.
Theorem 2. The pressure reading p is MSDND secure under attack in the absence
of alarms.
If the system is infected and a stuxnet-like virus is in the recording phase, all
messages are recorded and then relayed.
Proof. The pressure is not normal, ∼p = true. During the attack phase, the virus in
SD3 receives sensor reports and always reports to the PLC in SD2 that the pressure
is within desired range. The virus has corrupted the information path between the
sensor and the PLC. Refer to Figure 6.1 to clearly understand the proof.
1. p ⊕ ∼p = true;
2. Sp ⊕ S∼p = true; system is either normal or not normal
3. ∼p = true; pressure is not normal
4. w |= Vp0 (w) = false; the reading is not normal the valuation function in world
w is false
5. I3,0 ∼p; sensor reports problem to virus
6. B3 I3,0 ∼p; virus believes sensor report
7. T3,0 ∼p; virus trusts the sensors
8. B3 I3,0 ∼p; ∧ T3,0 ∼p → B3 ∼p; virus believes the reading
9. I2,3 p; virus always reports readings are correct
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Figure 6.1: Information Flow when p is not normal

10. B2 I2,3 p; PLC believes interface report
11. T2,3 p; PLC trusts reports
12. B2 I2,3 p ∧ T2,3 p → B2 p; PLC believes readings are correct
13. w |= Vp2 (w) = true; Vp2 (w) always returns true

2
MSDND(ES) = ∃ w ∈ W ` [ ( Sp ⊕ S∼p ] ∧ [ w |= ( 6 ∃ V∼p
( w) ∧ 6 ∃ Vp2 ( w) ) ]

Since B2 I2,3 p ∧ T2,3 p → B2 p, the PLC believes the lie told in step 9 in all cases.
2
(w) cannot be evaluated.
Therefore, unknown to entities in SD2 , Vp2 (w) and V∼p

Therefore p is MSDND secure from SD2 .
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6.1.3. MSDND Under Attack With Alarms - p Is Beyond Threshold.
Corollary 2.1. In presence of high and low pressure alarms placed strategically on
the information path before the PLC, the pressure reading p beyond the threshold will
trigger the alarm making the information not MSDND secure.
Proof. In this situation, the pressure p is not normal. Refer Figure 6.2 to clearly
understand the proof.
1. p ⊕ ∼p = true;
2. Sp ⊕ S∼p = true; system is either normal or not normal
3. ∼p = true; pressure is not normal
4. w |= Vp0 (w) = false; the reading is not normal the valuation function in world
w is false

Figure 6.2: Information Flow when p is not normal and alarm triggers
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5. I1,0 ∼p; sensor reports problem to alarm/control room
6. B1 I1,0 ∼p; alarm believes sensor report
7. T1,0 ∼p; alarm trusts the sensors
8. B1 I1,0 ∼p ∧ T1,0 ∼p → B1 ∼p; alarm believes the reading
9. I5,2 ∼p; alarm triggers
10. B5 I5,1 ∼p; operator believes alarm
11. T5,1 ∼p; operator trusts alarm
12. B5 I5,1 ∼p; ∧ T5,1 ∼p → B5 ∼p; operator believes readings are correct but not
normal
5
5
13. w |= V∼p
(w) = true; V∼p
(w) always returns true

5
( w) ∧ 6 ∃ Vp5 ( w) ) ]
MSDND(ES) = ∃ w ∈ W ` [ ( Sp ⊕ S∼p ) ] ∧ [ w |= ( ∃ V∼p

5
Since B5 I5,1 ∼p ∧ T5,1 ∼p → B5 ∼p. Therefore, in SD5 , V∼p
(w) can be

evaluated. The operator knows that pressure is not in desired range. Therefore p is
not MSDND secure from SD5 .
Remark: If there is a physical alarm on the information path and an entity i
looks because he or she does not trust the electronic reports, the pressure of the vessel
is not MSDND secure with respect to any entity that checks the physical alarm. But
what happens if the agents believe the cyber reports from the attacker and there is no
alarm as a backup? In this case, the attacker uses the implicit trust that the operators
have in their monitoring systems to introduce MSDND into the attack and to hide
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the attack. This allows the attacker to disrupt the flow of critical information, i.e. the
pressure of the vessel is outside of optimal range. The CPS has been compromised.
While designing a typical chemical plant, engineers also consider a few heuristic rules to determine the dimensions, orientations, locations etc of the physical instruments in the plant. The physical properties of these instruments along with few
readings from the actual reaction usually determine the bounds (low/high) on the
alarms for a given parameter like temperature, pressure, flow rate etc. These parameters should be in the optimal range for the plant to work safely and properly, and
usually there is only one source (sensors) of information for these readings. Combining these readings along with ground truths; i.e., the invariants, we can determine if
there is a cyber attack in the plant or if there is a faulty sensor. The following theorems and proofs help us in understanding the critical role invariants play in making
the system secure.
Some of the invariants for the benzene plant are [2]:
• The overall material balance for the benzene process
total input = total output
• The conversion per pass of toluene to benzene
• Temperature of the reactor
tR−101 = ts6 + treaction – ts7

6.2. MSDND ANALYSIS OF TEMPERATURE t AT THE REACTOR
Interaction between reactor (R-101) and Phase separator (V-102): During the
normal operation of the system, since the reaction is exothermic, H2 is continuously
pumped back from V-102 to the reactor to regulate the temperature for reactor. There
are several factors influencing the temperature of the reactor; however, considering
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only the temperature parameter related to various streams, the following invariant
gives us the net temperature of the reactor.

tR−101 = ts6 + treaction − ts7

(6.1)

tR−101 is in desired range iff ts6 , treaction , ts7 are in desired ranges.
Note: The security domains on the temperature information path are similar
to that of the pressure information path in Figure 4.2.
6.2.1. MSDND Under Normal Working Conditions.
Theorem 3. The temperature reading t is not MSDND secure if all the components
of the systems are working normally.
Proof. tR−101 ⊕ ∼ tR−101 is always true [temperature of the reactor is either in the
desired range or not].
1. tR−101 ⊕ ∼ tR−101 = true
2. St ⊕ S∼t = true; system is either normal or not normal
Domain

Valuation

Correctness

T-101

Vtr−101 (∼t)

True

3. Stream 6

Vts6 (∼t)

True

Stream 7

Vts7 (∼t)

True

Reaction

Vtreaction (∼t)

True

i
4. MSDND(ES) = ∃ w ∈ W ` [ ( St ⊕ S∼t ) ] ∧ [ w |= ( ∃ V∼t
( w) ∧ 6 ∃ Vti ( w) ) ]

5. Clearly, if all the devices are working correctly, the valuations Vpi , Vti of the
domains can be evaluated which contradicts the second part of the MSDND
definition.
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Therefore the system is not MSDND secure under normal working conditions.
Note: We can deduce the valuation of any one variable if we know the other
three variables [ignoring external factors].
6.2.2. MSDND Under Attack With Alarms - t Is Beyond Threshold.
Under attack, the pressure is not normal, which implies the H2 gas that is pumped
to R-101 to regulate the temperature is not in desired quantities, as a result the
temperature of R-101 increases which might cause damage. However, the temperature
control valve on R-101 tries to regulate the H2 to maintain the desired temperature,
but if H2 being pumped is not enough (due to attack on V-102 that produces H2 )
R-101 cannot maintain its temperature. The operator monitoring cannot deduce if
the rise is temperature is due to lack of H2 , faulty valve system, high temperature
of input feed from stream 6 or faulty reaction. This would imply that the attack is
MSDND secure. With the addition of the invariant (6.1), however, we get a different
result.
Theorem 4. The temperature reading t is not MSDND secure when there is an attack
on the connected pressure information path in presence of alarms.
Proof. Assuming the following equation for temperature measurements. Refer Figure 6.3 to clearly understand the proof.
tR−101 = ts6 + treaction – ts7 (treaction is constant assuming the behavior of the reaction
won’t change) tR−101 is out of range ⇒ ts6 or ts7 is faulty or both are faulty or the
sensor at tR−101 is faulty.
Suppose ts7 is faulty:
1. t ⊕ ∼t = true
2. St ⊕ S∼t = true; system is either normal or not normal
3. ∼t = true; temperature is not normal
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4. w |= Vt0 (w) = false; the reading is not normal, the valuation function in world
w returns false

Figure 6.3: Information flow when t is not normal

5. I1,0 ∼t; sensor reports problem to alarm/control room
6. B1 I1,0 ∼t; alarm believes sensor report
7. T1,0 ∼t; alarm trusts the sensors
8. B1 I1,0 ∼t ∧ T1,0 ∼t → B1 ∼t; alarm believes the reading
9. I5,2 ∼t; alarm triggers
10. B5 I5,1 ∼t; operator believes alarm
11. T5,1 ∼t; operator trusts alarm
12. B5 I5,1 ∼t ∧ T5,1 ∼t → B5 ∼t; operator believes readings are correct but not
normal
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5
5
13. w |= V∼t
(w) = true; V∼t
(w) always returns true

5
( w) ∧ 6 ∃ Vt5 ( w) ) ]
MSDND(ES) = ∃ w ∈ W ` [ ( St ⊕ S∼t ) ] ∧ [ w |= ( ∃ V∼t

5
Since B5 I5,1 ∼t ∧ T5,1 ∼t → B5 ∼t. Therefore, in SD5 , V∼t
(w) can be eval-

uated. The operator knows that temperature is not in desired range. Therefore t is
not MSDND secure from SD5 .
Similarly, the temperature t is not MSDND secure from SD5 when ts6 is faulty
or both ts6 and ts7 are faulty or the sensor at R-101 is faulty or all three are faulty.
However, we can infer that even though the temperature information is not MSDND
secure in case of attack, the origin of the attack cannot be deduced.

Remark: What if the pressure valve is manipulated in such a way that the temperature of the reactor lies between the desired limits, i.e. the alarm will not trigger?
Temperature being in the desired range indicates that the reaction is as per the
process. However, we can still see that there is something wrong in the pressure
information path due to the presence of the virus. Can we detect it? The alarms are
very coarse and do not detect subtle attacks that compromise the product quality
and process efficiency.

6.2.3. MSDND Under Attack - t Is Within Limits.
Theorem 5. The temperature reading t is MSDND secure when the actual temperature is not normal but the reading is normal.
Proof. In this world the actual temperature t is not normal, but the readings are
normal (the system operates within the broad threshold limits of the alarms, Refer
Figure 6.4).
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1. t ⊕ ∼t = true
2. St ⊕ S∼t = true; system is either normal or not normal
3. ∼t = true; temperature is not normal
4. w |= Vt0 (w) = true; the reading is normal in this world
5. I1,0 t; sensor report temperature is normal/fine to alarm/control room
6. B1 I1,0 t; control room monitor believes sensor report
7. T1,0 t; control room monitor trusts the sensor
8. B1 I1,0 t ∧ T1,0 t → B1 t; control room monitor believes the reading

Figure 6.4: Information Flow when t is normal
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9. I5,1 t; operator observes the monitor
10. B5 I5,1 t; operator believes monitor
11. T5,1 t; operator trusts monitor
12. B5 I5,1 t ∧ T5,1 t → B5 t; operator believes readings are correct and normal
13. w |= Vt5 (w) = true; Vt5 (w) always returns true
5
MSDND(ES) = ∃ w ∈ W ` [ ( St ⊕ S∼t ) ] ∧ [ w |= ( 6 ∃ V∼t
( w) ∧ 6 ∃ Vt5 ( w) ) ]

The operator believes that temperature is in desired range. However, unknown
5
to entities in SD5 (operator), Vt5 (w) and V∼t
(w) cannot be evaluated. Therefore, t is

MSDND secure from SD5 . The temperature reading is consistent with both working
and non-working states of the system. This proof clearly shows that even though there
is a problem in the connecting system, if it somehow manages to operate within the
range it can go undetected.
6.2.4. MSDND Analysis Of Temperature t In Presence Of Invariant.
For a reaction between reactants A and B to produce C.

aA + bB → cC

(6.2)

the reaction rate is found to be of the form[16]

r = K(T )[A]m [B]n

(6.3)

Here k(T) is the reaction rate constant that depends on temperature. [A] and [B] are
the molar concentrations of substances A and B in moles per unit volume of solution,
assuming the reaction is taking place throughout the volume of the solution.
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The Arrhenius equation gives the quantitative basis of the relationship between the activation energy and the reaction rate at which a reaction proceeds. The
rate constant is then given by

K = AeEa /RT

(6.4)

r = AeEa /RT [A]m [B]n

(6.5)

where Ea is the activation energy, and R is the gas constant and A is the frequency
factor.
So, if the threat goes undetected for a long period of time and since the rate of
the reaction is exponentially proportional to the temperature, it might cause sudden
failure to the system with adverse consequences.
However, when we take the invariant (6.1) into consideration, the operator
now has two valuation sources for the same parameter and s/he can compare and
come to a consensus. If the values from the invariant and the sensor match, the
system is working correctly and if both are different, there is something wrong in the
system.
Theorem 6. The temperature reading t is not MSDND secure when the actual temperature is not normal and the reading is normal if the invariant (6.1) is taken into
consideration.
Proof. Let us assume that ts6 and treaction are correct. Let the invariant tR−101 = ts6
+ treaction – ts7 be in a security domain SD6 (Refer Figure 6.5)
1. t ⊕ ∼t = true
2. St ⊕ S∼t = true; system is either normal or not normal
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Figure 6.5: Information Flow when t is normal and using invariant

3. ∼t = true; temperature is not normal
4. w |= Vt0 (w) = true; the reading is normal in this world
5. I1,0 t; sensor report temperature is fine to alarm/control room
6. B1 I1,0 t; control room monitor believes sensor report
7. T1,0 t; control room monitor the sensors
8. B1 I1,0 t ∧ T1,0 t → B1 t; control room monitor believes the reading
9. I5,1 t; operator observes the monitor
10. B5 I5,1 t; operator believes monitor
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11. T5,1 t; operator trusts monitor
12. B5 I5,1 t ∧ T5,1 t → B5 t; operator believes readings are correct and normal
13. ∼ tR−101 =⇒ ∼t; from assumption and invariant
14. I5,6 t; operator observes the invariant
15. B5 I5,6 t; operator believes the invariant
16. T5,6 t; operator trusts the invariant
17. B5 I5,6 t ∧ T5,6 t → B5 t; operator believes readings are correct and normal
18. Sinvariant ∧ St = S ” ; system is working normally if and if only this is true
19. w |= Vt5 (w) = true
5
( w) ∧ ∃ Vt5 ( w) ) ]
MSDND(ES) = ∃ w ∈ W ` [ ( S ” ⊕ S∼t ) ] ∧ [ w |= ( 6 ∃ V∼t

Vt5 (w) exists, it can be evaluated from the invariant, which contradicts the
second part of MSDND definition. Therefore, the system is not MSDND secure,
and a potential threat can be detected. This is good for the plant and bad for the
attacker.
A careful analysis can lead to several invariant equations that govern the
operation of the entire plant. A few of the invariant equations are as follows [2]:
• The overall material balance for the benzene process
Input = Output
Stream 3 + Stream 1 = Stream 15 + Stream 16
[Toluene feed + Hydrogen feed] == [ Benzene produced + Fuel gas produced]
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• conversion per pass of toluene to benzene in R-101 Toluene introduced= 144
(Stream 6) + 0.04 (Stream 7) = 144.04 kmol/h
Benzene produced = 116 (Stream 9) - 7.6 (Stream 6) - 0.37 (Stream 7) = 108.03
kmol/h
 = 108.03/144.04 = 0.75
Alternatively, the following can be written:
Moles of benzene produced= Toluene in - Toluene out == 144.04 - 36.00 =
108.04 kmol/h
 = 108.04/144.04 = 0.75
• tR−101 = ts6 + treaction – ts7

6.3. MSDND ANALYSIS OF FLOW RATE f OF STREAMS IN AND
OUT OF THE REACTOR
The streams that are flowing into the reactor are stream 6, stream 7 and out
of the reactor is stream 9, these can be clearly seen in Figure 6.6. The flow rates of
each stream are critical, stream 6 carries the input feed(heated mixture of toluene
and hydrogen) while stream 7 carries the compressed hydrogen from phase separator
into the reactor to regulate the temperature of the reactor. stream 9 carries the outputs (benzene and other unreacted and residual components). The flow rates of these
streams contribute to the amount of materials present in the reactor, temperature of
the reactor and also the efficiency benzene production; i.e., the conversion ratio .
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Figure 6.6: Information Flow when f is normal

6.3.1. MSDND Under Attack - f Is Beyond Threshold. Since, there
is an attack on the pressure information path at stream 8 in Figure 6.6, the flow
rate of stream 7 and stream 9 may not be normal. This can lead to a cascading
failure or huge damage to the reactor, few other impacts on the plant are increase in
temperature of the reactor, decrease in efficiency, material accumulation and overflow
of the reactor etc.
Theorem 7. The flow rate f is not MSDND secure if it triggers the alarms.
Proof. The value of f is beyond the threshold and the alarms are triggered. We know
that f ⊕ ∼f is true all the time [either flow rate is in the desired range or not].
1. f ⊕ ∼f = true;
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2. Sf ⊕ S∼f = true; system is either normal or not normal
3. ∼f = true; flow rate is normal
4. w |= Vf0 (w) = false; the reading is not normal in this world
5. I1,0 ∼f; sensor report problem to alarm/control room
6. B1 I1,0 ∼f; alarm believes sensor report
7. T1,0 ∼f; alarm trusts the sensors
8. B1 I1,0 ∼f ∧ T1,0 t → B1 t; alarm believes the reading
9. I5,2 ∼f; alarm is triggered and operator observes the alarm
10. B5 I5,1 ∼f; operator believes alarm
11. T5,1 ∼f; operator trusts the alarm
12. B5 I5,1 ∼f ∧ T5,1 ∼f → B5 ∼f; operator believes readings are correct and not
normal
5
5
13. w |= V∼f
(w) = true; V∼f
(w) always returns true

5
MSDND(ES) = ∃ w ∈ W ` [ ( Sf ⊕ S∼f ) ] ∧ [ w |= ( ∃ V∼f
( w) ∧ 6 ∃ Vf5 ( w) ) ]

5
V∼f
(w) exists, which contradicts the second part of MSDND definition. There-

fore, f is MSDND secure. This is clearly good for the plant since the attack can be
detected.
6.3.2. MSDND Under Attack - f Is Within Limits.
Theorem 8. The flow rate f is MSDND secure if f lies within the broad threshold
limits of the alarms.
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Proof. In this situation the actual f is not normal, however the readings show that
f is normal.
1. f ⊕ ∼f = true; either flow rate is in the desired range or not
2. Sf ⊕ S∼f = true; system is either normal or not normal
3. ∼f = true; flow rate is not normal
4. w |= Vf0 (w) = true; the reading is normal in this world
5. I1,0 f; sensor report flow rate is fine to alarm/control room
6. B1 I1,0 f; control room monitor (or alarm) believes sensor report
7. T1,0 f; control room monitor (or alarm) trusts the sensors
8. B1 I1,0 f ∧ T1,0 f → B1 f; control room monitor (or alarm) believes the reading
9. I5,1 f; operator observes the monitor (or alarm)
10. B5 I5,1 f; operator believes monitor (or alarm)
11. T5,1 f; operator trusts monitor (or alarm)
12. B5 I5,1 f ∧ T5,1 f → B5 f; operator believes readings are correct and normal
13. w |= Vf5 (w) = true; Vf5 (w) always returns true
5
MSDND(ES) = ∃ w ∈ W ` [ ( Sf ⊕ S∼f ) ] ∧ [ w |= ( 6 ∃ V∼f
( w) ∧ 6 ∃ Vf5 ( w) ) ]

5
Therefore, unknown to entities in SD5 , Vf5 (w) and V∼f
(w) are consistent

with both working conditions and not working conditions of the system. Therefore f
is MSDND secure from SD5 . This is bad for the system.
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6.3.3. MSDND Analysis Of Flow Rate f In Presence Of Invariant.
If the flow rate resides within the threshold limits, can we detect the stuxnet like
attack in the plant? It can be clearly seen from the above proof that if the virus
operates in such a way that the values reside within the threshold limits, the threat
goes undetected. The following theorem and proof will help understanding the effectiveness of invariants in determining the security of the system. The invariant that
can be used in this case is the conversion ratio.

=

(stream7 + stream6)benzene
(stream9 − stream6 − stream7)toluene

(6.6)

Theorem 9. The flow rates f7 and f9 are MSDND secure in presence of an invariant.
Proof. The critical part of this proof is the construction of an invariant. Considering
the conversion ratio (6.6); i.e., conversion per pass of toluene to benzene, we get the
following:
1. f ⊕ ∼f = true; either flow rate is in the desired range or not
2. Sf ⊕ S∼f = true; system is either normal or not normal
3. f(f7 && f9 ) = true; flow rate is normal
4. w |= Vf0 (w) = true; the reading is normal in this world
5. I1,0 f7 ; sensor reports flow rate is normal to alarm/control room
6. B1 I1,0 f7 ; alarm/control room monitor believes sensor report
7. T1,0 f7 ; alarm/control room monitor trusts the sensors
8. B1 I1,0 f7 ∧ T1,0 f7 → B1 f7 ; alarm/control room monitor believes the reading
9. I5,1 f7 ; operator observes the monitor
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10. B5 I5,1 f7 ; operator believes sensor report
11. T5,1 f7 ; operator trusts the monitor
12. I1,0 f9 ; sensor reports flow rate is normal to alarm/control room
13. B1 I1,0 f9 ; alarm/control room monitor believes sensor report
14. T1,0 f9 ; alarm/control room monitor trusts the sensors
15. B1 I1,0 f9 ∧ T1,0 f9 → B1 f9 ; alarm/control room monitor believes the reading
16. I5,1 f9 ; operator observes the monitor
17. B5 I5,1 f9 ; operator believes sensor report
18. T5,1 f9 ; operator trusts the monitor
19. = original conversion ratio as per the process
20. c = conversion ratio calculated from f7 and f9 readings from the sensors
21. if  = c the system is working correctly.
22. if  != c the system is not working correctly.
5
MSDND(ES) = ∃ w ∈ W ` [ ( Sf ⊕ S∼f ) ] ∧ [ w |= ( ∃ V∼f
( w) ∧ 6 ∃ Vf5 ( w) ) ]

5
V∼f
(w) exists, which contradicts the second part of MSDND definition. This

can be evaluated from the invariant. Therefore, f is not MSDND secure even though
the values lie within the threshold limits of the alarms. This is good for the plant
and bad for the attacker.
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7. DISTILLATION COLUMN - PHASE-II

A detailed analysis of the impact of stuxnet-like attack on the pressure path
(modeled in the previous section) on phase-II of the chemical plant; i.e., the distillation column of the plant, is shown in this section.

7.1. DISTILLATION PROCESS
This is the final phase (phase-II) of the benzene production process. In this
phase, the desired product is separated from the byproducts and the unreacted components. That is, benzene is separated from unreacted toluene, unreacted hydrogen
and the by-product methane. The distillation column is used to purify the benzene
product by separating all the unreacted components and the byproducts (Figure 7.1).
This tower consists of 42 sieve trays, a reboiler, a condenser, a reflux drum, and a
reflux pump. Toluene exits as a liquid in the bottom at a temperature of 1120 C
and 2.43 bar. The overhead containing benzene, traces of hydrogen and methane, is
condensed at a temperature of 1120 C and a pressure 2.5 bar. Cooling water is used
to condense the vapor exiting the column. The remaining hydrogen and methane
are then separated in the reflux drum; this vapor stream is combined with the other
gaseous streams at the overhead of the first separator, and the overhead of the second
separator, which are combined to form the fuel gas. The liquid stream exiting the
bottom of the reflux drum is pumped to a discharge pressure of 3.3 bar. The pumped
stream is separated into two streams. One stream is fed to tray one of the column and
the other stream is cooled down to 380 C in the heat exchanger. The cooled product
stream is then sent to storage.
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Figure 7.1: Distillation column and information paths[2]
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Information flow: A level sensing element (LE) is located on the reflux drum
V-104. A level transmitter (LT) also located on V-104 sends an electrical signal (designated by a dashed line) to a level indicator and controller (LIC). This LIC is located
in the control room on the control panel or console (as indicated by the horizontal
line under LIC) and can be observed by the operators. From the LIC, an electrical
signal is sent to an instrument (LY) that computes the correct valve position and
in turn sends a pneumatic signal (designated by a solid line with cross hatching) to
activate the control valve (LCV). In order to warn operators of potential problems,
two alarms are placed in the control room. These are a high-level alarm (LAH) and
a low-level alarm (LAL), and they receive the same signal from the level transmitter
as does the controller. It is a simple matter to infer that if there is an increase in the
level of liquid in V-104, the control valve will open slightly and the flow of benzene
product will increase, tending to lower the level in V-104. For a decrease in the level
of liquid, the valve will close slightly.

Figure 7.2: Simplified distillation column [3]
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Invariants in the distillation column designed from the material balances are
the most fundamental equations that can be written for any process. From Figure 7.2
we can see that F = D + B, where F is feed, D is distillate and B is bottoms.

F =D+B

(7.1)

Any long-term change in the distillate flow must be offset by an equal and opposite
change in the bottoms flow and similarly any long-term change in the bottoms flow
must be offset by an equal and opposite change in the distillate flow [3].
Most distillation columns operate in a fixed service, which means that
• the feed flow F is explicitly specified or is determined by upstream unit operations
• the feed composition is determined by upstream unit operations
When the distillation column goes into unsteady state, the following possibilities arise:
1. Feed rate exceeds the sum of the product rates. Material accumulates somewhere within the tower.
2. Feed rate is less than the sum of the product rates. Material depletes somewhere
within the tower.
Material accumulates or depletes primarily either in the reflux drum, in the bottom
of the column, or both.

7.2. MSDND ANALYSIS IN THE DISTILLATION COLUMN
The most important parameters in consideration are level indicator l, and flow
rate f . We also know that if the flow rate, time and level are given we can calculate
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the molar masses. [assuming we know the chemical components of each stream]. In
this section, a structured analysis of MSDND for the parameters f and l is shown.

7.2.1. Effects Of The Attack On Flow Rate And Level. Since there is
a stuxnet-like attack in the chemical plant, let us assume that the feed to distillation
column is affected, two cases arise
1.
F <D+B

(7.2)

F >D+B

(7.3)

2.

The responsibility of every level controller is to close some material balance.
To assure that the column material balance closes, every column control configuration
must contain one of the following:
1. The reflux drum level is controlled by manipulating the distillate flow.
2. The bottom level is controlled by manipulating the bottom flow.
In the presence of effectively placed alarms, if F > B + D, then the holdup
increases (material is accumulated) until some limiting condition is attained, the
limiting condition being either
1. the level in the reflux drum actuates the high level switch or
2. the level in the bottoms actuates the high level switch.
If F < B + D. The holdup decreases until some limiting condition is attained,
the limiting condition being either
1. the level in the reflux drum actuates the low level switch or
2. the level in the bottoms actuates the low level switch.
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7.2.2. MSDND Under Attack - f And l Are Beyond Threshold.
The following proofs show that in presence of alarms and the readings going beyond
the threshold the information is not MSDND secure, which is good for the plant.
Theorem 10. The flow rate f is MSDND secure in presence of alarms. This statement holds true for f at F, B and D as shown in Figure 7.2 if they are affected.
Proof. Assuming the alarms are working and will trigger if the values go beyond a
certain threshold.
1. ∼f = true; flow rate is not normal
2. w |= Vf0 (w) = false; the reading is not normal, the valuation function in world
w returns false
3. I1,0 ∼f; sensor reports problem to alarm/control room
4. B1 I1,0 ∼f; alarm believes sensor report
5. T1,0 ∼f; alarm trusts the sensors
6. B1 I1,0 ∼f ∧ T1,0 ∼f → B1 ∼f; alarm believes the reading
7. I5,2 ∼f; alarm triggers
8. B5 I5,1 ∼f; operator believes alarm
9. T5,1 ∼f; operator trusts alarm
10. B5 I5,1 ∼f ∧ T5,1 ∼f → B5 ∼f; operator believes readings are correct but not
normal
5
5
11. w |= V∼f
(w) = true; V∼f
(w) always returns true
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5
MSDND(ES) = ∃ w ∈ W ` [ ( Sf ⊕ S∼f ) ] ∧ [ w |= ( ∃ V∼f
( w) ∧ 6 ∃ Vf5 ( w) ) ]

5
(w) can be evaluSince B5 I5,1 ∼f ∧ T5,1 ∼f → B5 ∼f. Therefore, in SD5 , V∼f

ated. The operator knows that flow rate is not in desired range. Therefore f is not
MSDND secure from SD5 .
Theorem 11. The level indicator l is MSDND secure in presence of alarms. This
statement holds true for l at F,B and D as shown in Figure 7.2 if they are effected.
Proof. Assuming the alarms are working and will trigger if the values go beyond a
certain threshold.
1. ∼l = true; flow rate is not normal
2. w |= Vl0 (w) = false; the reading is not normal, the valuation function in world
w returns false
3. I1,0 ∼l; sensor reports problem to alarm/control room
4. B1 I1,0 ∼l; alarm believes sensor report
5. T1,0 ∼l; alarm trusts the sensors
6. B1 I1,0 ∼l ∧ T1,0 ∼f → B1 ∼f; alarm believes the reading
7. I5,2 ∼l; alarm triggers
8. B5 I5,1 ∼l; operator believes alarm
9. T5,1 ∼l; operator trusts alarm
10. B5 I5,1 ∼l ∧ T5,1 ∼l → B5 ∼l; operator believes readings are correct but not
normal
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5
5
11. w |= V∼l
(w) = true; V∼l
(w) always returns true

5
MSDND(ES) = ∃ w ∈ W ` [ ( Sl ⊕ S∼l ) ] ∧ [ w |= ( ∃ V∼l
( w) ∧ 6 ∃ Vf5 ( w) ) ]

5
Since B5 I5,1 ∼l ∧ T5,1 ∼l → B5 ∼l. Therefore, in SD5 , V∼l
(w) can be evaluated.

The operator knows that level is not in desired range. Therefore l is not MSDND
secure from SD5 .
The above proofs show that if a physical entity like an operator sees the
physical alarms present in the plant while observing the sensor reports, a MSDND
secure path can be converted into a not MSDND secure path which is good for the
plant. However, when the virus operates in such a way that the values l and f reside
within the threshold limits and alarms are not triggered, the system is MSDND secure
which is bad for the plant as the threat goes undetected.
7.2.3. MSDND Under Attack - f And l Are Within Limits.
Theorem 12. The flow rate f is MSDND secure if f lies within the broad threshold
limits of the alarms.
Proof. In this world, the actual flow rate f is not normal. However, the readings are
normal.
1. f ⊕ ∼f = true; either flow rate is in the desired range or not
2. Sf ⊕ S∼f = true; system is either normal or not normal
3. ∼f = true; flow rate is is not normal
4. w |= Vf0 (w) = true; the reading is normal in this world
5. I1,0 f; sensor reports flow rate is fine to alarm/control room
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6. B1 I1,0 f; control room monitor believes sensor report
7. T1,0 f; control room monitor the sensors
8. B1 I1,0 f ∧ T1,0 f → B1 f; control room monitor believes the reading
9. I5,1 f; operator observes the monitor
10. B5 I5,1 f; operator believes monitor
11. T5,1 f; operator trusts monitor
12. B5 I5,1 f ∧ T5,1 f → B5 f; operator believes readings are correct and normal
13. w |= Vf5 (w) = true; Vf5 (w) always returns true
5
MSDND(ES) = ∃ w ∈ W ` [ ( Sf ⊕ S∼f ) ] ∧ [ w |= ( 6 ∃ V∼f
( w) ∧ 6 ∃ Vf5 ( w) ) ]

5
Unknown to entities in SD5 (operator), Vf5 (w) and V∼f
(w) cannot be eval-

uated. Therefore, f is MSDND secure from SD5 . The flow rate is consistent with
both working and non-working states of the system.
Theorem 13. The level reading l is MSDND secure if l lies within the broad threshold
limits of the alarms.
Proof. In this world, the actual level l is not normal. However, the readings are
normal.
1. l ⊕ ∼l = true; either flow rate is in the desired range or not
2. Sl ⊕ S∼ = true; system is either normal or not normal
3. ∼l = true; level is normal
4. w |= Vl0 (w) = true; the reading is normal in this world

51
5. I1,0 l; sensor reports flow rate is fine to alarm/control room
6. B1 I1,0 l; control room monitor believes sensor report
7. T1,0 l; control room monitor the sensors
8. B1 I1,0 l ∧ T1,0 l → B1 l; control room monitor believes the reading
9. I5,1 l; operator observes the monitor
10. B5 I5,1 l; operator believes monitor
11. T5,1 l; operator trusts monitor
12. B5 I5,1 l ∧ T5,1 l → B5 l; operator believes readings are correct and normal
13. w |= Vl5 (w) = true; Vl5 (w) always returns true
5
MSDND(ES) = ∃ w ∈ W ` [ ( Sl ⊕ S∼l ) ] ∧ [ w |= ( 6 ∃ V∼l
( w) ∧ 6 ∃ Vl5 ( w) ) ]

5
Unknown to entities in SD5 (operator), Vl5 (w) and V∼l
(w) cannot be evalu-

ated. Therefore, l is MSDND secure from SD5 . The level l is consistent with both
working and non-working states of the system.
7.2.4. MSDND Under Attack - With Invariant. Similar to the Theorems 6 and 9 the invariant (7.1) proves that the system is not MSDND secure even
when the virus operates in such a way that the readings reside within the threshold
limits of the alarms. The following proof illustrates the same.
Theorem 14. The flow rates f at B and D are not MSDND secure when the invariant
(7.1) is considered.
Proof. Let the flow rate at B be fb and flow rate at D be fd .
1. fb = true; flow rate is normal
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2. w |= Vf0b (w) = true; the reading is normal in this world
3. I1,0 fb ; sensor reports flow rate is fine to alarm/control room
4. B1 I1,0 fb ; control room monitor believes sensor report
5. T1,0 fb ; control room monitor the sensors
6. B1 I1,0 fb ∧ T1,0 fb → B1 fb ; control room monitor believes the reading
7. I5,1 fb ; operator observes the monitor
8. B5 I5,1 fb ; operator believes monitor
9. T5,1 fb ; operator trusts monitor
10. B5 I5,1 fb ∧ T5,1 fb → B5 fb ; operator believes readings are correct and normal
Similarly, for the flow rate fd we get,
11. fd = true; flow rate is normal
12. w |= Vf0d (w) = true; the reading is normal in this world
13. I1,0 fd ; sensor reports flow rate is fine to alarm/control room
14. B1 I1,0 fd ; control room monitor believes sensor report
15. T1,0 fd ; control room monitor the sensors
16. B1 I1,0 fd ∧ T1,0 fd → B1 fd ; control room monitor believes the reading
17. I5,1 fd ; operator observes the monitor
18. B5 I5,1 fd ; operator believes monitor
19. T5,1 fd ; operator trusts monitor
20. B5 I5,1 fd ∧ T5,1 fd → B5 fd ; operator believes readings are correct and normal
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21. F = D + B; operator observes the invariant equation
22. Fnew = fd + fb ; operator calculates Fnew from readings of fb and fd from steps
10 and 20 respectively.
23. F 6= Fnew ; operator observes the mismatch and thus has a valuation for system
not working correctly.
5
5
24. w |= V∼f
(w) = true; V∼f
(w) always returns true

5
MSDND(ES) = ∃ w ∈ W ` [ ( Sf ⊕ S∼f ) ] ∧ [ w |= ( ∃ V∼f
( w) ∧ 6 ∃ Vf5 ( w) ) ]

This is how invariants derived from physical and chemical processes of a system
can be used to evaluate an information flow path (for various critical parameters) and
convert a path from MSDND secure (bad for the plant) to not MSDND secure (good
for the plant) to detect a possible threat. This analysis uses alternative information
paths for a parameter in consideration to model security and therefore making it much
more difficult for the attacker to compromise the system. In-order to damage the
system without getting deduced by an operator, the attacker has to corrupt multiple
information paths which is very difficult and therefore providing more resiliency to
the system.
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8. CONCLUSION

MSDND is useful to model attacks where the goal is to hide critical information
from an operator rather than to steal information. MSDND secure is bad for the
system and good for the attacker because information can be hidden by making it
impossible to evaluate the desired question, or to falsify the actual valuation function
to produce an invalid valuation and thus making the information MSDND secure
and undetectable. A system with fewer MSDND secure information paths between
the CPS and monitors/observers has fewer vulnerabilities. Stuxnet-like attacks in
CPS adapt to the system and replay valid readings even though they disrupt the
functionality. Attacks like these can be detected to some extent by strategically
adding physical alarms on the information paths and an entity i monitoring them.
However, when these attacks disrupt the functionality without kicking off the alarms,
the invariants play a vital role by acting as a secondary source of information for the
given parameter. We were able to prove that a system with a MSDND secure path
can be reduced to a not MSDND secure system using a proper invariant, thus making
the system much more secure and reliable. With the help of invariants it has been
proved that an attack can be detected even if the system operates within the threshold
limits and there are no alarms. The operator need not wait for the alarms to trigger
before s/he notices there is something wrong with the system. Usage of invariants is
especially critical when the attacker operates within tight bounds. By finding more
information paths and invariants involving critical parameters and embedding them
into the MSDND framework, the system can be made more resilient. The attacker
now has to corrupt multiple information paths to compromise the system, making
it even more difficult and tedious to the attacker. No system is 100 percent secure,
this thesis provides a way to assess the information paths and the state of a system
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and provide a higher degree of security and resiliency. Some of the critical points
to focus in future are to find a method to optimally divide the system into security
domains and to automate the MSDND proof derivation based on the number of
security domains and the information flowing in the given path.
Table 8.1 and Table 8.2 show the results of MSDND analysis of critical parameters in a benzene production plant.
Table 8.1: MSDND analysis results: reactor and phase separator
Theorem Information Path

MSDND Plant
status

1

β under normal conditions

No

Good

2

p under attack(No alarms)

Yes

Bad

2.1

p under attack(with alarms) No

Good

3

t under normal conditions

No

Good

4

t when p is attacked(with

No

Good

alarms)
5

t when p is attacked, under Yes

Bad

threshold (with alarms)
6

t when p is attacked, under No

Good

threshold (with invariant)
7

f when p is attacked(with

No

Good

alarms)
8

f when p is attacked, under Yes

Bad

threshold
9

f when p is attacked, under No
threshold with invariant

Good
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Table 8.2: MSDND analysis results: distillation column
Theorem Information Path

MSDND Plant
status

10

f when p is attacked (with No

Good

alarms)
11

l when p is attacked (with

No

Good

alarms)
12

f when p is attacked, under Yes

Bad

threshold
13

l when p is attacked, under Yes

Bad

threshold
14

f when p is attacked, under No
threshold (with invariant)

Good
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